After a year of debating 5G risks, all EU countries are meant tell the bloc’s executive branch in Brussels before the summer how they plan to implement new security measures.
The measures come after EU countries in January adopted a joint strategy for governments to limit Huawei’s market dominance and ease up on using Chinese equipment. Several countries have since turned that strategy into law, and cybersecurity authorities are set to release a progress report by end-June.
In the coming months, some countries may yet decide to tighten or loosen their approach, with telecoms operators playing a key role. The CEOs of giants including Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica urged governments in mid-March to „ensure that corresponding costs are compensated through adequate measures, including fiscal measures.”
Here’s a closer look at how European countries have responded to the Trump-led campaign on Huawei:
Friends to the east
Early on in the debate, Washington secured the support of Romania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and the Czech Republic, all of which have signed joint statements or memorandums with the U.S. government on 5G security.
These are nonbinding, political pledges that, if implemented, would cut market access to suppliers that are subject to foreign interference, lack transparent corporate ownership structures and violate international ethical norms and intellectual property protections.
While the statements send a clear signal, they have little value if they are not backed up by law forcing telecoms companies to abide by their terms.
In Poland, the government in past weeks fast-tracked legislation on 5G security to make sure the next spectrum auction would include tougher rules on high-risk vendors, overriding the telecoms regulator. Warsaw’s digital minister said in February the country would restrict “high-risk” 5G telecoms vendors in ways that go beyond security controls proposed by the EU.
In Estonia, parliament has passed amendments to its Electronic Communications Act that would require operators to coordinate with the country’s communications authority on 5G rollout. That means input from the country’s security and intelligence services, opening the door to more restrictive measures against high-risk vendors.
The Czech Republic proved a strong advocate of the U.S. approach on the European stage, anchoring the „Prague Principles“ that built a Western consensus around Chinese vendors.
Germany, Trump’s (almost) Waterloo
If any capital has been hard to convince, it’s Berlin.
The German government was one of the first to be courted by U.S. diplomats about the issue — and quickly rebuffed their arguments.
Skepticism about Washington’s allegations against Huawei fueled Berlin’s caution, but so did the government’s trauma of U.S. surveillance practices and the hacking of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone years earlier. What’s more, Germany’s leading operators Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone have existing 4G telecoms networks that rely on Huawei for well over half of their total makeup. The German government also fears that barring the Chinese vendor would heavily damage its ties with China, its largest trading partner.
However, the debate is ongoing. After months of pressure from parliament and Merkel’s smaller coalition partner, the interior ministry earlier this month proposed a draft law, seen by POLITICO, that would increase security requirements for 5G suppliers, including granting that ministry new powers to block nontrusted suppliers from the market.
But it’s unclear how the government plans to assess suppliers’ trustworthiness. Merkel’s allies in the government are still skeptical of any hard restrictions on using Chinese equipment.
“The real meat is in how this gets done, and who decides on trustworthiness,” said Thorsten Benner, director of the Global Public Policy Institute. “We’re dithering and allowing companies to create insecure networks.”
France’s tech sovereignty ambition
France has sought to take a leading role on 5G security in Europe as part of efforts to put itself front and center of international affairs.
The country already had national security checks on operators’ cybersecurity policies and on their use of vendors in key parts of its networks. Last year, it added provisions in its national telecoms laws that allow the prime minister’s office, through the cybersecurity agency, to block operators’ use of „RAN“ network equipment like base stations and antennae if doing so would harm national security.
“Since the beginning of December operators must obtain an authorization from the prime minister for any deployment of base stations,” Guillaume Poupard, the country’s chief cybersecurity official, said in February. That means the government, through Poupard, can block deployment if they don’t like the supplier of the kit.
“We consider telecommunication operators as critical operators,“ Poupard said. „They have to work with us in order to protect our networks. They cannot only try to make money.“
France’s model — which avoids naming Chinese vendors — is one of heavy government oversight and intervention over the 5G rollout process.
Huawei has sought to nudge Paris’ decision-making by promising millions of investment in a first-of-its-kind European manufacturing base. But a diplomatic spat involving Beijing’s ambassador to Paris has caused tension between the two countries, with little news on the factory plans since the pandemic hit.
Battleground states
Several European countries stand out in their strategic importance — both for Huawei and the U.S. government.
Italy, the EU’s third largest economy, early last year expanded its „golden power rule,“ a trade defense tool that allows the government to block contracts between operators and equipment vendors. At the end of last year it passed legislation on a cybersecurity „perimeter“ that would impose new requirements on telecoms and IT services used in „strategic“ sectors. The government is now finalizing a list of businesses, sectors and government organizations that would fall under the tighter regime.
In Belgium — another strategic country because it houses NATO headquarters and the main EU institutions — intelligence services advised the government to limit the use of „non-trusted suppliers“ and officials are drafting the legal provisions that are expected to cut Chinese vendors at least from „core“ network parts.
The Dutch government, seen as traditionally close to the U.S. on cybersecurity and intelligence issues, in December adopted new provisions that allow it to ban vendors from the market if there is a suspicion that they could sabotage a network or that have close ties or legal obligations to foreign governments that harm security. The Netherlands earlier flagged that it would require operators to ban high-risk vendors from „core“ networks.
The undecideds
These capitals have mostly tested Trump’s patience.
Many governments are still consulting with telecoms companies, intelligence services and regulatory agencies about proposing legal changes that would box out high-risk vendors. That’s the case in Madrid, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Stockholm, Vienna, Helsinki and other capitals.
In Spain, the economy minister in February said she was preparing legal acts, but the country since then faced delays and had to push back a spectrum auction. Meanwhile, Spanish telco giant Telefónica said it would reduce the amount of Huawei kit in new networks (but still procure the Chinese vendor), while Orange said it would use ZTE, Huawei and Ericsson in Spain.
In Sweden, home of Huawei’s main competitor Ericsson, and in Finland, where European challenger Nokia is based, the governments are still making up their minds on how to beef up security regulations in the telecoms market.
The surprise state
In Denmark, the government is preparing legislation that would define its entire 5G network as critical infrastructure, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told newspaper Berlingske in May. It would put core, non-core and other parts of networks under tough security requirements.
Copenhagen’s approach would reshape the telecom market, but the government has yet to call out specific vendors. “We have not yet defined the objective criteria in the legislation. But when we look at the choice of supplier as an area of security policy, then that means the security alliance that we are part of and have our roots in,” Frederiksen said.
The move came after a diplomatic storm between China and Denmark over Huawei’s role. The Chinese ambassador to Denmark in December reportedly said a trade deal between the Faroe Islands (an autonomous part of Denmark) and China would be dropped if Huawei was not able to secure contracts for the rollout of 5G on the island.
Britain goes Europe’s way on Huawei
The United Kingdom was leading the EU discussion on 5G security until it left the bloc in February.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson at the end of January announced the government will allow Huawei to sell equipment for 5G networks but keep its access limited to peripheral, non-sensitive parts of the network. It also imposed a cap of 35 percent on Huawei’s market share — a type of measure that, so far, no European government has copied.
Above all, Britain’s relationship with the U.S. is shaping its policy on 5G security. That includes calls for a hard reboot of its approach to China.
“The Huawei debate is exposing perhaps a wider, very difficult discussion about our relationship with China, which we today perhaps have been in a little denial about,” the chairman of the defense committee in the U.K. House of Commons Tobias Ellwood told POLITICO in a recent interview.
He added: “As much as the Americans are wanting us to stay away from the Chinese, the bigger question for all of us is: How did we get here?”
Source: politico.com
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